Knowing Intentions: What Do You See—Actors or Actions?

Do ordinary citizens place more credibility on signals from democracies than non-democracies? When and under what conditions do they assess democratic signals as more or less credible than those from non-democracies? This paper argues that democracies can make their signals more credible than non-democracies and can be perceived as such but offers a new explanation for why democratic credibility can still go unobserved. This study examines democratic advantage in signaling by decomposing it into two components: the perceived signaling capability gap—the difference in how observers evaluate the signaling capabilities of democracies versus non-democracies, and the prior belief difference—the difference in prior beliefs about the inherent aggressiveness of both regime types. This model offers a robust theoretical framework for understanding how prior beliefs about a signaler’s aggressiveness can independently affect the credibility of state signals during crises. This model is tested through survey experiments in the United States and China.