Propaganda by Proxy: How Autocrats Use Surrogates to Conceal Their Control of the Media

Autocrats use the media to generate popular support, yet individuals opposed to the regime tend to distrust and avoid state-owned sources. How do autocrats reach these skeptical actors? In this paper, I examine a strategy in which autocrats control private media outlets through proxies, thereby concealing these outlets' connections to the government and rendering them more credible to regime opponents. Fielding surveys in four Sub-Saharan African countries, I find that the vast majority of citizens living in autocracies are unable to identify which private outlets are owned by regime proxies. I then present evidence from a series of field experiments showing that concealed ownership works: it makes opponents more likely to consume regime-controlled news sources and more likely to be persuaded by their pro-regime coverage. These results challenge the notion that propaganda only influences an autocrat's loyal supporters, pointing to conditions under which it reaches and persuades more discerning audiences.