Shaping the Bench: The Effect of Ideology and Performance on Judicial Reappointments

Judicial appointments allow selectors to advance policy goals by appointing influential judges who share their ideological preferences. Under renewable terms, information from judicial records becomes crucial for identifying desirable candidates. While prior research has focused on judicial voting, we examine how expectations about judges’ influence on case law shape reappointments. Using original data on all potential reappointments to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), we show that governments select judges based on both ideology and potential impact. Secret voting -- intended to safeguard judicial independence -- fails to shield judges from ideological deselection. However, reappointment levels remain high because governments recognize the need to translate preferences into policies. Peer selection to influential court positions thus favors the reappointment of high-performing judges, while non-selective processes do not. Our findings challenge the belief that renewable terms weaken judicial independence, showing that selectors indirectly rely on peer evaluations for reappointments.