Cutting Off the Respirator: Aspiring Autocrats and Subnational Autonomy

Recent scholarship has argued that when countries face democratic erosion at the hands of aspiring autocrats, one of the most important bulwarks against backsliding is local government. The degree to which resilience can manifest at the subnational level depends on the ability of local officials to effectively use fiscal resources, in order to convince voters of their competence and build their power. I argue that aspiring autocrats target local revenue independence, reducing the autonomy of their opponents while increasing the resources at their disposal. I focus on Poland (2015-2023). Using a novel dataset of municipal finances and electoral results, I conduct a close elections RDD. I find that electing a mayor aligned with the aspiring autocrat governing party has a significant positive effect on municipal fiscal autonomy. This paper contributes to the literature on democratic resilience by establishing how aspiring autocrats take advantage of subnational fiscal policy to erode democracy.