Abstract
In the past decades Chinese investment in Africa has grown drastically, yet the degree to which China engages in sustainable infrastructure development also betrays China's evolving political ambitions in the Sub-Saharan African region. This paper utilizes basic Game Theory models to answer such questions as what economic conditions are nascent African economies likely to tolerate Debt Trap Diplomacy, what circumstances is it in China's interest to pursue such economic strategies, and to what degree do such transactions result in moral hazards? Applicable to both Chinese state owned enterprises and global financial institutions, the analysis seeks to guide policy makers in better understanding China's investment patterns in the world's fastest growing continent.
Supplementary materials
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Chinese Investment Model
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Exploitation Factor as a Function of Default Chance
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Equilibrium Solution
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Equilibrium Solution
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Imperfect Information Variant
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Imperfect Information Variant Equilibrium Graph
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Three Actor Variant
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