Abstract
Political polarization in the United States has been treated, persistently, as a problem of mass psychology: reduce partisan dislike and democratic health improves downstream. Four bodies of recent evidence disrupt this assumption. Cross-national measurement across twelve OECD democracies shows that affective polarization trends correlate strongly with elite polarization—a structural variable—but not with inequality, internet penetration, or trade openness. Experimental research finds that interventions reliably reducing affective polarization do not reduce support for antidemocratic candidates or partisan violence. A formal evolutionary model demonstrates that polarization, once established under economic stress, exhibits hysteresis: it persists after the conditions producing it have reversed and takes on the character of a social dilemma resistant to individual-level correction.Read together, these findings identify a configuration that Rittel and Webber (1973) classified as a wicked problem—one for which first-generation diagnostic methods are constitutively inadequate. The methodological and prescriptive implications have not been fully absorbed by the field.

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