Agenda Influence Under Information Asymmetry: Policy Domain Maturity, Congressional Capacity, and Agency Expertise

Research on legislative agendas recognizes bureaucratic dynamism but often treats agency influence as a uniform baseline, overlooking variation across policy domains. This paper argues that bureaucratic agenda influence is conditional on capacity asymmetries between congressional committees and executive agencies across domains. On the demand side, domain maturity shapes how congressional staff capacity drives agency reliance. On the supply side, policymaking capacity determines which agencies gain access when congressional demand intensifies. Using a panel of 20 policy domains across the 93rd–114th Congresses—combining Comparative Agendas Project data with capacity measures—the analysis reveals that congressional capacity and agency presence act as complements during stable periods. Substitution emerges only during punctuation events under unified government, where high-capacity agencies secure disproportionate access during disruptions. However, attention structure ultimately follows domain-specific maturity trajectories through institutional path dependence, independent of congressional or agency capacity.