Why do protest movements lead to regime change in some competitive authoritarian regimes but fail in others: Evidence from the Quota Reform Movements in Bangladesh (2013- 2024)

Why do protest movements lead to regime change in some competitive authoritarian regimes but fail in others? Bangladesh has witnessed three waves of student-led protest movements in 2013-2024 under the regime of Sheikh Hasina. Why were the outcomes of these movements different despite having similar demands? This paper explains this puzzle by process tracing the cross-temporal variation of protest movement outcomes in Bangladesh in 2013-2024 through a most similar systems (MSS) comparative design. We look at variables such as participation size and diversity, level of repression, strategic coordination, and loyalty shifts that influence the outcomes. The findings suggest that the combination of strategically coordinated mass mobilization, heightened repression, and loyalty shifts significantly increases the likelihood of successfully challenging incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes.