Abstract
This paper studies the determinants (and economics) of free-riding in the swimming stage of mass-start triathlon. The theoretical framework builds upon non-discriminatory Tullock contests, modeling triathlon as a simplified two-stage game with quadratic effort costs, and extends to n-player and asymmetric settings in which drafting multiplicatively reduces heterogeneous effective marginal costs. Empirically, I construct an event-study measure of free-riding based on relative rank changes across the two stages to capture free-riding propagation, centered on the exceptional 2020 season, during which nondrafting rules were enforced due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Causal identification combines pooled OLS (POLS) with athlete and event fixed effects (FE), as well as a regression discontinuity design (RDD) exploiting COVID-19 policy–induced rule changes—specifically, individually staggered starts—that mechanically reduced drafting potential and, consequently, its utilization. Additionally the economic analysis chapter uses elasticity, production frontier, and conditional quantile methods to primarily examine group-size effects.
