The Construction of US-China Strategic Competition: A LLM-Advanced Analysis

24 August 2026, Version 1
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed at the time of posting.

Abstract

That US-China relations have turned competitive is widely agreed; when the turn came, and what drives Beijing's adversarial posture toward Washington, are not. Classifying more than 100,000 Chinese and US documents from 2001 to 2025 with a Large Language Model (Google Gemini), we trace each side's characterization of the other at daily frequency. The US-China rivalry, we find, crystallized sequentially rather than simultaneously. American uncertainty about Chinese intentions eroded steadily as the conviction that China is a competitor or a revisionist took hold. Washington's discourse turned durably adversarial in March 2018; Beijing reciprocated in May 2019, and with that mutual turn a new Cold War in US-China relations took shape. Time-series modeling then shows that none of Beijing's own self-perception narratives—nationalist, capability, or interest—predicts its subsequent adversity toward the US. Instead, it is prior confrontational US statements that harden Chinese posture.

Keywords

China
the US
great power competition
computational social sciences
content analysis
large language model

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