Party-list Proportional Representation and the Single Transferable Vote are Not Functionally Equivalent

28 August 2026, Version 1
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed at the time of posting.

Abstract

Do party-list proportional representation (PR) and the single transferable vote (STV) produce different results? These reforms are hotly debated in American politics, but most answers to the question come from non-U.S. cases. This paper replicates and extends the best existing analysis of U.S. data. Gosnell (1939) simulated list PR elections from observed STV first choices in Cincinnati (1925- 37) and New York City (1937), finding that majority control of government did not change across the systems. Later work took this to mean that both kinds of PR were equivalent with respect to preference aggregation. Reappraisal and extension of the study do not support that view. All else equal, voters’ lower rankings changed majority control in five of 21 elections, one of which was in the original sample. These results offer fresh perspective on ballot exhaustion and ticket-splitting, research into which otherwise often frustrates reform advocates.

Keywords

preference aggregation
party-system fragmentation
proportional ranked-choice voting

Comments

Comments are not moderated before they are posted, but they can be removed by the site moderators if they are found to be in contravention of our Commenting Policy [opens in a new tab] - please read this policy before you post. Comments should be used for scholarly discussion of the content in question. You can find more information about how to use the commenting feature here [opens in a new tab] .
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy [opens in a new tab] and Terms of Service [opens in a new tab] apply.