Abstract
This paper investigates why Western states transferred sensitive nuclear technology to Asian recipients throughout the 1970s despite growing proliferation risks. It introduces "nuclear consciousness," a qualitative measure of how supplier states understood their own permissible behavior in the international nuclear market given their nuclear history and capabilities. Using comparative process-tracing, it examines the export behavior of France, Canada, and West Germany between the beginning of the NPT in 1968 and the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, framed by a triangular dynamic of U.S. interdiction, supplier commercial and prestige interests, and recipient demand for nuclear independence. France's nuclear consciousness proved resilient despite pressure, Canada's shifted decisively toward restraint after India's 1974 test, and West Germany's remained comparatively fragile. This study finds that these divergent postures show the global nuclear market was less asymmetric than assumed, offering lessons for the modern resurgence of the nuclear industry and commercial proliferation.

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