Justice under Imperfect Implementation

16 November 2026, Version 1
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed at the time of posting.

Abstract

Economic institutions can announce justified entitlements while failing to secure them. This paper argues that institutional admissibility depends on substantive protections and their implementation. It develops a conditional case for effective adjudicative access and distinguishes institutional reliability from permission to violate. A stochastic bound shows how unavoidable delay and irreversible harm limit correction. A tractable model separates prevention from correction under regulatory capture and identifies conditions governing their allocation. Oversight and screening expand institutional choices without supplying a political equilibrium theory of capture. An income example examines when protected claims warrant constraint status, while numerical illustrations and an administrative appeals example expose limits of aggregate performance measures. The contribution is a conditional account of protection under imperfect implementation, supported by explicit assumptions, bounds, and comparative statics. Working paper, October 24, 2026; not yet peer reviewed. Research guide: https://george-skouras.com/articles/justice-under-imperfect-implementation/

Keywords

institutional legitimacy
adjudicative access
regulatory capture
non-ideal theory
welfare economics

Supplementary weblinks

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