Coalitions of the Willing: Designing Legislation for the Votes You Need

16 November 2026, Version 1
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed at the time of posting.

Abstract

Most laws require support from members of both parties. We test whether the coalition that enacts a bill leaves a signature in the scope and structure of the law it produces. In applying an enacting coalition typology to all public laws passed since 1947, we assess the impact on two measures of legislative design: the breadth of the legislation (versatility) and the clarity with which the law is written (precision). We find a clear relationship between the enacting coalition and the versatility of a law. Bipartisan laws are scoped more narrowly than more partisan legislation. For precision, we report null results. We complement our statistical approach by interviewing the House Office of the Legislative Counsel and two Senate legislative directors to understand how these mechanisms function. Our results suggest that versatility is a feature of the coalition that is bargained over, whereas precision is contingent on conditions within a Congress.

Keywords

enacting coalition
legislative design
bipartisanship
drafting
Congress

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