Abstract
Why do some third-party states expand trade with sanctioned targets while others do not? I develop a typology of commercial logics to distinguish dependence from commercial embeddedness. Using directed dyad-year data on third-party trade with sanctioned targets from 1963–2023, I show that third-party trade share and intra-industry trade are both associated with sanctions busting, but these relationships vary with the economic size difference between the third party and target. Among economically similar states, sanctions busting is concentrated where trade is both commercially important and intra-industry in nature, consistent with embedded interdependence. Among highly asymmetric states, sanctions busting is concentrated at comparatively lower levels of third-party trade share when intra-industry trade is present, suggesting uneven commercial opportunities that commercial dependence cannot capture. Sanctions busting is best understood as emerging from distinct configurations of commercial exposure and embeddedness that vary with the economic size difference between third parties and targets.
Supplementary materials
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Online supplement for working paper
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This file contains the online supplement for the working paper.
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