Abstract
This paper constructs a unified political economy framework to explain factor mobility barriers and income inequality across state forms. We introduce the "tax-eater," a rational agent possessing coercive redistribution capacity, and combine it with class attributes of the bourgeoisie and laborers to define four ideal types: Bonapartism, capitalism, dictatorship of the proletariat, and association of free individuals. Using a Cobb–Douglas production function with Stackelberg and Cournot game equilibria, the model demonstrates that: (1) international factor immobility stems from domestic classes' resistance to marginal product dilution and the tax-eater's coercive capacity; (2) with differential tax-setting power, a pure bourgeoisie cannot survive long-run equilibrium—the tax-eater itself becomes the primary agent of accumulation; (3) a downward-sloping labor supply curve generates an endogenous exploitation trap, locking workers' utility at subsistence threshold while technological progress merely augments tax-eater income. This framework provides micro-foundations for re-examining state capacity, class differentiation, and economic efficiency.
