When Law Becomes Wealth: Why Political Science Must Take Legal-Accounting Power Seriously

24 August 2026, Version 1
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed at the time of posting.

Abstract

Who holds power when wealth concentrates? Political science has built a precise account of how concentrated wealth is deployed: donated, lobbied, converted into unequal responsiveness. This paper asks how it is produced. I develop the concept of legal-accounting power: the capacity of multi-jurisdictional corporate groups and their professional intermediaries to produce profit through classification, moving value between cost and capital, licence and ownership, asset and expense. It is architectural: no one designed the structure, yet every use is a deliberate, documented decision, so this power, unusually among quiet forms, leaves a paper trail. Using Irish unconsolidated accounts, which reveal what US consolidated accounts conceal, I trace how American intellectual property becomes concentrated corporate profit. The concentration is an antitrust problem in the neoBrandeisian sense, and its invisibility a problem for capitalist democracy. The paper offers political science a new concept and method, forensic accounting as process tracing: balance sheet politics.

Keywords

Comparative Political Economy
International Political Economy
American Political Economy
Business Power
Inequality
Corporate Taxation

Supplementary weblinks

Comments

Comments are not moderated before they are posted, but they can be removed by the site moderators if they are found to be in contravention of our Commenting Policy [opens in a new tab] - please read this policy before you post. Comments should be used for scholarly discussion of the content in question. You can find more information about how to use the commenting feature here [opens in a new tab] .
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy [opens in a new tab] and Terms of Service [opens in a new tab] apply.